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Magicians use misdirection to prevent you from realizing the methods used to create
a magical effect, thereby allowing you to experience an apparently impossible event.
Magicians have acquired much knowledge about misdirection, and have suggested
several taxonomies of misdirection. These describe many of the fundamental principles
in misdirection, focusing on how misdirection is achieved by magicians. In this article
we review the strengths and weaknesses of past taxonomies, and argue that a more
natural way of making sense of misdirection is to focus on the perceptual and cognitive
mechanisms involved. Our psychologically-based taxonomy has three basic categories,
corresponding to the types of psychological mechanisms affected: perception, memory,
and reasoning. Each of these categories is then divided into subcategories based on the
mechanisms that control these effects. This new taxonomy can help organize magicians’
knowledge of misdirection in a meaningful way, and facilitate the dialog between
magicians and scientists.
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INTRODUCTION
Misdirection—manipulating the spectator away from the cause
of a magic effect—is widely considered a central element of
the practice of magic: “[m]isdirection is a principle element in
the art of deception“ (Randal, 1976, p. 380), “magic is mis-
direction and misdirection is magic” (Hugard, 1960, p. 115),
and “[m]isdirection is the meat of deception, the stuff of which
illusion is made” (Leech, 1960, p. 6). But whilst many books
and articles have been written on it, a clear understanding of
this concept remains elusive (Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). This
paper attempts to provide such an understanding. It will review
previous work on this topic, attempt to determine the psycho-
logical mechanisms involved, and suggest a taxonomy based on
these mechanisms, one that can help guide when and where
misdirection might be best employed.
Several taxonomies of misdirection have been suggested previ-
ously; these are useful for identifying and describing many of the
fundamental principles involved. Most of these taxonomies have
focused on the particular ways that misdirection can be achieved.
In contrast, we propose that a more natural, less arbitrary way of
making sense of misdirection is by emphasizing as much as pos-
sible the underlying psychological mechanisms. In order to get a
better sense of which mechanisms these might be, we will first
attempt to define misdirection more precisely1 .
WHAT IS MISDIRECTION?
Misdirection is sometimes defined “as the intentional deflection
of attention for the purpose of disguise” (Sharpe, 1988, p. 47); as
1Throughout the manuscript we refer the reader to videos that describe some
of the misdirection methods (see supplementary material).
such, it would encompass anything that prevents you from notic-
ing the secret method (i.e., the technique used to bring about
the observed effect). It has also been suggested that misdirec-
tion is not simply about directing attention away from the cause
of a magic effect, but toward something interesting, which again
prevents the spectator from noticing the method (Wonder, 1994).
Whilst some misdirection principles involve manipulating
what people attend to (and thus, what they see), “real misdi-
rection deceives not only the eye of the spectator, but his mind
as well” (Leech, 1960, p. 6), More precisely, successful misdirec-
tion might manipulate not only people’s perceptions, but their
memory for what happened, or their reasoning about how the
effect was done. A distraction that prevents people from experi-
encing an effect—whether by manipulating perception, memory,
or reasoning—is clearly futile (Lamont and Wiseman, 1999).
Misdirection is also ineffective if it allows people to see (or work
out) the method, since a key aspect of magic is the witnessing of
an event that is apparently impossible. If people become aware of
the misdirection, the impossible becomes possible, and the magic
disappears (Pareras, 2011).
Another important feature of misdirection is that the prin-
ciples used should be counterintuitive. For example, attentional
misdirection is particularly effective when it exploits our incorrect
assumptions about perception. Phenomena such as change blind-
ness and inattentional blindness strongly suggest that instead of
being dense and complete, our visual representations are relatively
sparse, with attention being the critical element in visual aware-
ness (Rensink, 2002, 2013). Our surprise at violations of these
assumptions illustrates the gap between what we believe about
our perceptual systems and their actual operation (Levin et al.,
2000), making it a perfect phenomenon for magicians to exploit.
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Whilst central to magic, misdirection is also used in many
other domains. Politicians are often accused of misdirecting the
attention of the public away from bad news, and military generals
occasionally use misdirection (e.g., feints) to gain advantage over
their enemies (Freudenburg and Alario, 2007). Although misdi-
rection is not used in these examples to create a magical effect,
many of the principles are the same, e.g., making sure that there
is no awareness of the misdirection itself (Bond and Robinson,
1988).
WHY DOWE NEED A TAXONOMY?
Over the years, magicians have acquired vast amounts of useful
knowledge about effective misdirection. Although much of this
knowledge has been discussed in theoretical articles and books,
it tends to be described only in the context of individual magic
tricks; making sense of—or even just accessing—this knowledge
is often challenging for both magicians and non-magicians alike.
One way to handle this is via a taxonomy. These are central
to many scientific domains, aiding our understanding in fields
such as chemistry, biology, and even mineralogy. If we intend to
truly understand any aspect of magic—including misdirection—
a taxonomy must be a crucial part of this endeavor (Rensink and
Kuhn, under review).
Previous taxonomies of misdirection were developed from the
perspective of magic performance (Leech, 1960; Ascanio, 1964;
Randal, 1976; Bruno, 1978; Sharpe, 1988), or were based on
rather informal psychological principles (Lamont and Wiseman,
1999). The central aim of our effort is to develop a more rig-
orous and less subjective system, one based as much as possible
on known psychological mechanisms. Among other things, this
approach can help draw more direct links between practical
principles and current scientific understanding of the human
mind.
PREVIOUS TAXONOMIES OF MISDIRECTION
Magicians and scholars have written about misdirection for cen-
turies; a full history of this is beyond the scope of the discussion
here. Instead, we will simply review several of the more pop-
ular taxonomies which have been proposed; in particular, we
review those based on relatively abstract principles, so as to high-
light those principles to non-magicians. (Note that some of these
taxonomies describe the same principles using different names.)
ARTURO ASCANIO: MAGICAL ATMOSPHERE
In 1958 Arturo de Ascanio published a book which changed the
way magic was understood. Ascanio was not the first to do so
(e.g., Houdin, 1877; Fitzkee, 1945), but his was a particularly
clear and systematic approach. Titled “Conception of the Magical
Atmosphere,” one of its cornerstones is misdirection, included
within a set of techniques about how to cover the secret of a
magical effect. This set uses what Ascanio called the Principle
of Coverage. Here, coverage refers to the “defense mechanisms”
used by the magician to hide the method of any magical effect. In
the words of Ascanio: “[its goal is to] ensure that the secrets are
not shown, not known to exist, not even suspected” (Etcheverry,
2000d, p. 35).
Ascanio highlighted not only the importance of understand-
ing the psychology of the spectator (misdirection, timing, etc.),
FIGURE 1 | Schematic description of Ascanio’s (1964) taxonomy.
but also that of the magician (naturalness, fluency of movements,
handling, and so on) (Pareras, 2011). He defined misdirection as
“the art of drawing the eye and the attention of the public to a
safe and interesting point, while elsewhere a secret action, which
is therefore invisible and unsuspected, is carried out” (Etcheverry,
2000b, p. 47). However, he later noted (Ascanio, 1964) that this
definition was in fact “poor,” since misdirection could have three
different grades, or levels of intensity (Figure 1):
First grade—dissolution (lowest)
This is achieved by giving the spectator two distinct points of
interest: the secret, along with an innocuous other event. The
spectator’s attention is thereby divided and their experience of the
secret “dissolved,” since it is impossible to completely attend to
two different points at the same time.
Second grade—attraction (medium)
Here, the innocuous point of interest is more attractive to the
spectator than the secret one. It therefore grabs their atten-
tion away from the method/secret, effectively removing any real
experience of its structure.
Third grade—deviation (highest)
This is achieved by a total deviation of the gaze and attention of
the spectator to the innocuous point of interest. This results in
a complete absence of visual experience of the remainder of the
scene, including the secret.
When these techniques succeed, attention is focused on the
innocuous point of interest, known as the “illuminated” area,
with the secret remaining in the “shadowy” area (the lower atten-
tion area). This is what Ascanio called the Tube Effect (Etcheverry,
2000c, p. 78), comparable to the spotlight metaphor of atten-
tion (Posner, 1980). These areas (illuminated and shadowy) could
be physical or mental, as there may be a mental distraction (a
question, or something to make the spectator think about, and
that would be a “illuminated area”) while the secret action is
performed in the shadows2.
2Interestingly, the kinds of subjective experience created by Ascanio’s three
grades of misdirection appear to loosely correspond to the three grades
of visual experience posited as resulting from different levels (or kinds) of
attention (Rensink, 2013, 2015).
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Later authors in the world of magic built on Ascanio’s work.
As an example, Randal (1976) discussed five types of misdirec-
tion. The first is Misdirection of Attitude, whereby the magician
marks the points of interest with his gaze and attitude. Second
is Misdirection by Transfer (comparable to the manipulation
in the third grade of Ascanio’s theory), in which the magician
directs the attention of the spectator, using gestures and glances,
toward a point far away from the place where the magic secret is
happening. Third is Misdirection by Repetition, which accustoms
the spectator to a specific gesture (by repetition) in order to relax
their attention when that gesture performs the secret movement
(Etcheverry, 2000a). Finally, he differentiates between Verbal
Misdirection, which emphasizes the speech of the magician
(to distract the attention), and Non-Verbal Misdirection,
including the gestures, personality, and attitude of the
magician.
JOE BRUNO: ANATOMY OF MISDIRECTION
In 1978 Joe Bruno wrote a book titled “Anatomy of Misdirection,”
aimed at teaching magicians the ways in which attention can be
manipulated (Bruno, 1978). Possibly inspired by Buckley (1948),
his approach focuses on three distinct kinds of technique: distrac-
tion, diversion, and relaxation (Figure 2).
Distraction
Distraction refers to situations in which several things occur at the
same time. The premise here is similar to that of Ascanio: people
can only process a limited amount of information at anymoment,
so if their attention is distracted by one event they will not notice
anything in the unattended location(s). According to Bruno, one
type of distraction is external to the proceedings, generally taking
the form of an unexpected event such as an interruption. This can
range between crude and subtle. An example of a crude external
distraction would be a loud bang. This is extremely effective but
can easily disrupt the performance, and so diminish the effect.
Consequently, magicians usually opt instead for subtler forms,
such as a well-timed cough.
In contrast, integral distractions are core parts of the perfor-
mance. According to Bruno there exist three types: confusion,
flustering, and perplexity. Confusion can potentially occur during
various parts of a performance; for instance, when the magician
asks a spectator to join him on stage. Such moments offer valu-
able opportunities to execute a method, such as switching a deck
of cards. Flustering can be achieved by asking the spectator a dif-
ficult or potentially embarrassing question; not only does this
distract the person, but it ensures that the rest of the audience
focuses their attention on the spectator, and thus, away from the
magician. Finally, perplexity occurs in a situation that is either
complicated or puzzling to the spectator. This is rather chal-
lenging to create, as there is a fine line between confusion and
boredom, and the latter should be avoided at all cost.
Diversion
If people become aware of being distracted, it can take away from
the effect, which is why distraction tends to be considered a sub-
optimal technique. Instead, magicians generally prefer diversion,
which differs from distraction in that only one thing appears to
be going on. Like distraction, diversion can be either external
or integral to the performance. External diversions are digres-
sions where attention is oriented away from the method via an
apparently unconnected event. For example, the magician may
use an amusing interlude that captures the audience’s attention
and thus allows the magician to execute his secret method unno-
ticed. Meanwhile, integral diversions are built into magic tricks
themselves.
Bruno identified five types of diversion. Switching refers to
the side-tracking of attention from one area of interest to the
other—e.g., each time the magician produces a new prop, atten-
tion switches to this new object. Next is masking, whereby one
action screens another. For example, the magician may change his
body orientation so that the view of his hand going to his pocket
is obstructed or at least becomes less salient. The third principle is
disguise,where an action appears to be performed for one purpose
when in reality it is done for another. For instance, the magician
might reach into his pocket to pull out a scarf when in fact the
action is used to deposit a secret prop. Related to this is the idea
that large motions will disguise small ones. Fourth is pointing,
where the magician pauses for a dramatic emphasis. A method
must be executed either before or after these pauses, to avoid
detection. Finally, one of the strongest diversions of attention can
be created by using the climax of an effect. This offers an ideal
moment at which the method for the next effect can be executed.
FIGURE 2 | Schematic description of Bruno’s (1978) taxonomy.
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For example, in the Cups and Balls routine, small climaxes such
as when the balls appear or disappear offer ideal diversions
of attention that allow the magician to prepare for the next
effect.
Relaxation
Bruno’s third general principle is relaxation; this relates to
the temporal fluctuations in attention created though off-beat
moments in a routine. For example, attentional de-emphasis can
occur once a magic trick has been concluded: if the magician
picks up a bowl in preparation for his next trick, say, the audi-
ence won’t suspect the execution of the method at that time.
Meanwhile, anticipation can get spectators to relax their atten-
tion because they think they know what is going to happen.
Relaxation can also be created through repetition, whereby the
magician repeats an action several times, so that the spectator
will pay less attention to the subsequent action (Bruno, 1978;
Kaufman, 1989).
Bruno’s taxonomy provides valuable insights that can help
magicians think about attentional misdirection. However, it has
two serious limitations. First, it relies on a rather narrow def-
inition of misdirection in terms of attention, and so does not
discuss ways of manipulating what people remember, or how they
interpret an event. In addition, Bruno’s approach was written for
magic practitioners, and so does not directly link his principles
with known mechanisms of perception and cognition.
SHARPE: CONJUROR’S PSYCHOLOGICAL SECRETS
Sharpe (1988) published a book entitled “Conjuror’s
Psychological Secrets” that attempted to systematize much
of the psychological basis of conjuring (Figure 3). Its main focus
is on misdirection, defined as the “intentional deflection of
attention for the purpose of disguise” (p. 47), a definition that
again heavily relies on attention.
Sharpe divides misdirection into two kinds: active, which cov-
ers methods that depend on “some kind of change in movement
or sound” (p. 47), and passive, which covers methods where
“misdirection works unobtrusively on the spectator’s mind, owing
to an understanding of how the mind reacts to given static stim-
uli” (p. 47). Within each of these, misdirection can either disguise
something “by altering its appearance in some way, so that casual
attention fails to focus on it owing to lack of interest” (p. 47),
or distract the spectator by focusing their attention “elsewhere by
introduction a more powerful stimulus to act as a decoy” (p. 47).
Sharpe classified a wide range of misdirection methods in
terms of these four categories. For example, when magicians
familiarize the spectator with actions or objects, people relax
their attention and so become less aware of otherwise suspi-
cious behavior. This principle is categorized as active misdi-
rection for disguise since it prevents people from attending
(disguise) to the novel action (active). Active misdirection for
distraction often includes audience participation, e.g., asking a
person to join the magician on stage (active) draws attention
away from the magician and toward the volunteer (distraction).
Other forms include the use of patter (i.e., spoken presentation),
or different kinds of movement. Meanwhile, passive misdirec-
tion for disguise includes principles such as camouflage that
makes an object unnoticeable by obliteration, or immobility that
cause disregard though lack of movement. And passive misdi-
rection to distract includes the principle of novelty that can be
used to stimulate curiosity by presenting something unusual or
unfamiliar.
Sharp’s inventory is a useful starting point for a more
psychologically-based categorization of distraction techniques
and principles. However, his analysis is somewhat disjointed (e.g.,
he simply lists numerous concepts), and many key concepts are
loosely defined. For example, whilst misdirection is defined in
terms of attentional strategies, several non-attentional principles
are also included (e.g., those concerned withmemory, reasoning).
More importantly, perhaps, few links are made to formal psycho-
logical mechanisms. For example, misdirection is defined solely
in terms of attentional processes, and although non-perceptual
processes are described (e.g., memory), little attempt is made to
distinguish them from perceptual ones. And whilst the distinction
FIGURE 3 | Schematic diagram of Sharpe’s (1988) taxonomy.
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FIGURE 4 | Schematic diagram of Lamont and Wiseman’s (1999) taxonomy.
between distraction and disguise seems intuitive, the same cannot
be argued for active vs. passive misdirection3 .
LAMONT ANDWISEMAN: MAGIC IN THEORY
A more recent taxonomy is that of Lamont and Wiseman (1999),
who discuss various theoretical and psychological elements of
magic in their book “Magic in Theory” (Figure 4). Although both
authors are academics, they avoid making direct links with aca-
demic psychology; their framework is intended to focus on how
magic is understood by magicians rather than scientists.
Lamont and Wiseman define misdirection as “that which
directs the audience toward the effect and away from the method”
(p. 31), extending its scope beyond the simple manipulation of
attentional processes. They present a simple taxonomy of mis-
direction that explicitly distinguishes between attentional and
non-attentional processes, which are affected by what they define
as Physical and Psychologicalmisdirection, respectively.
Physical misdirection deals with manipulating people’s focus
of attention: “what the spectator perceives is determined by where
and when the spectator is looking, i.e., where and when the
spectator’s attention is focused” (p. 37). It is based on the idea—
similar to that proposed by others—that magicians create areas
of high interest, thereby preventing the spectator from noticing
things elsewhere. Three kinds of misdirection are distinguished,
involving passive, active, and temporal diversions of attention.
The first of these, passive misdirection, uses any property that
attracts attention in its own right—e.g., novelty, or sudden
changes in pace or facial expressions. Contrast is another impor-
tant example, whereby objects that differ from their background
will attract attention (e.g., bright colors that stand out).
Meanwhile, active misdirection relies on social interactions
created by the magician’s actions. For instance, the magician may
3Interestingly, the active-passive distinction corresponds somewhat to the
two forms of attentional control believed to exist by vision scientists: exoge-
nous control (reflexive control based on events such as a sudden change in
movement or sound), and endogenous control (higher-level, conscious control
based on the observer’s understanding of a situation). However, endogenous
control can be based on dynamic as well as static stimuli, something contrary
to Sharpe’s characterization.
use his eyes to direct attention toward looked-at areas, or use
his voice (through patter) to create interest in certain objects;
in some cases the magician might simply instruct a spectator to
look somewhere. Another form of active misdirection involves
body language, which can convey non-verbal information to
direct attention. The magician may also use an external source of
diversion, such as the actions of an assistant or a member of the
audience.
Lamont and Wiseman note that just as people tend to vary
their level of attention throughout space, they also tend to vary
their level of attention throughout time. The magician may
therefore create moments (as well as locations) of primary and
secondary interest—for example, people are less likely to pay
attention if they believe that the trick has not yet begun, or is
already over. Temporal fluctuations may also be exploited. For
example, repetition can lead to tedium, which reduces the spec-
tator’s level of interest, and therefore, attention. Alternatively, the
magician may create an off-beat moment through a momentary
relaxation, such as after a joke (Tamariz, 2007) or a magical effect.
These off-beat moments are thought to reduce attention, and thus
allow the magician to execute the method without being noticed.
Magicians may also use their body to create moments of tension
and relaxation (Ganson, 1980; Kurtz, 1989).
In contrast, psychological misdirection involves manipulating
people’s suspicions4 . Seeing a method clearly provides strong evi-
dence of its use, but there are many situations in which a method
may not have been seen, but is still suspected. Magicians often talk
about the need for actions to appear natural, as anything unnatu-
ral will generally arise suspicion. For example, in the French Drop
the magician pretends to pass a coin from one hand to the other
whilst retaining the coin in the original hand (Supplementary
Video 1). If this false transfer appears unnatural, it will arouse
suspicion and thus attract unwanted attention, resulting in its
detection.
4As in the case of Sharpe (1988), the physical-psychological distinction corre-
sponds somewhat to the exogenous- endogenous distinction generally made
by vision scientists. However, endogenous control of attention can involve any
aspect of conscious cognition, and not just suspicion.
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Lamont and Wiseman also discuss ways in which magicians
divert suspicion by misrepresenting the method. One of the most
powerful tools for this involves deliberately raising suspicion
about a false solution which will distract from the real solution.
This can be applied to differing degrees (Tamariz, 1988). An
extreme form is the “sucker trick,” in which the magician presents
an obvious yet false solution that is later revealed to be wrong.
For example, in the Egg Bag trick, an egg appears and disap-
pears inside a cloth bag. In the standard routine the magician
pretends to sneak the egg under his arm, after which he shows
the bag to be empty. The real method involves a secret compart-
ment inside the bag that allows to magician to conceal the egg;
when the bag is shown empty, it attracts little attention, since the
audience thinks it knows where the egg is. More subtle ways of
leading the audience down the garden path are also possible (e.g.,
Tamariz, 1988).
Lamont and Wiseman’s taxonomy of misdirection is a great
improvement on earlier efforts because it makes several impor-
tant links between magic theory and human cognition. However,
it lacks scientific rigor, and some of the categories still seem rather
arbitrary. For instance, looking and seeing (or at least, attending)
are treated as equivalent. However, this is not the case: research
has shown that you can look at things without seeing them (Mack
and Rock, 1998); indeed, eye movements are only one of several
forms of attention, which are not always co-ordinated with each
other (Rensink, 2013). Several other category divisions are also
rather problematic. For example, the terms “active” and “passive”
are misleading, and do not necessarily refer to mutually exclusive
processes: many passive misdirection principles, such as move-
ments, require actions, and it is difficult to see how this could be
considered anything other than active. More generally, many of
the terms and categories are rather vague, and not always based on
recent scientific models of cognition. A taxonomy that is to help
create connections between magic and science should be based as
much as possible on our current understanding of perception and
cognition.
A PSYCHOLOGICALLY-BASED TAXONOMY
The primary purpose of any taxonomy of magic is to organize the
methods and effects used in known magic tricks. An important
secondary purpose is to do so in a way that enables clear con-
nections to be drawn between the tricks and the psychological
principles they draw upon. To show how such a taxonomy might
look, we focus here on the area of misdirection.
As a first step, we will describe magic tricks in somewhat
abstract terms, focusing on the general factors that govern their
effectiveness, rather than the particular details of a performance.
(Ideally, however, both abstract and concrete taxonomies would
be possible—cf. Rensink and Kuhn, under review). And rather
than a taxonomy based directly on the particular methods used
or effects created, we propose one that arranges these (in their
abstract form) according to two fundamental taxonomic princi-
ples. First is the principle of maximal mechanism: the taxonomy
should be based as much as possible on known psychologi-
cal mechanisms and principles. Second is the principle of effect
priority: the highest levels of the taxonomy are those involv-
ing the mechanisms being affected (i.e., those underlying the
effect); the mechanisms controlling these (i.e., those underlying
the method) are secondary, relevant only after the first set has
been exhausted. Other considerations (e.g., aspects of the perfor-
mance) can still be included, although these would be relevant
only for those categories at the lowest levels. An important advan-
tage of this approach is that we can borrow well-established terms
and concepts from the behavioral sciences, and so avoid many
of the complications arising from vague or arbitrary categories.
Moreover, it makes the connections with known psychological
mechanisms quite clear, facilitating interaction between magi-
cians and researchers. Finally, it also minimizes the effect of
subjective elements in the structure of the taxonomy, opening up
the possibility of a system that might be accepted more generally5.
To see how such a taxonomy can be developed, begin by noting
that human cognition generally involves several different kinds of
information processing: when confronted with a magic trick the
observer first perceives the relevant sensory information, stores key
aspects of it in memory, and then perhaps uses this information
to reason out how the trick was done. To prevent a spectator from
discovering themethod, amagician couldmanipulate any of these
processes (Kuhn and Martinez, 2012).
Our taxonomy therefore has three broad categories, cor-
responding to the three broad kinds of mechanisms affected
(Figure 5). The first encompasses those procedures that manip-
ulate perceptual mechanisms, preventing you from noticing par-
ticular events. Even if an event is perceived accurately, however,
there is no guarantee you the spectator will accurately remember
it later on—our memories are very selective, and based on recon-
structions of fragments rather than complete representations of
objects or events (Fernyhough, 2012). Our second category there-
fore involves memory. But even an accurate memory of a magic
trick does not guarantee the spectator will discover the method if
he/she cannot bring to bear correct reasoning. Thus, the third cat-
egory of misdirection relates to manipulating the way that people
reason about an event6 .
Although these kinds of process operate separately to a large
extent, they are nevertheless interdependent. (This reflects the
interdependent operation of perceptual and cognitive mecha-
nisms generally). For example, our perception of an event influ-
ences what we remember, and our memories in turn guide our
reasoning and attention. Moreover, certain misdirection prin-
ciples can potentially influence cognitive functions at multiple
5Although such a taxonomy would be stable for the most part, it might change
slightly on occasion to incorporate the latest discoveries about psychological
mechanisms. Conversely, it might also help determine these.
6Although these systems are fairly distinct, there is still some degree of over-
lap. For example, memory of a kind exists in all perceptual processes (e.g.,
iconic memory in visual perception). Some forms of reasoning also take place
at a perceptual level (in that they need some intelligence to interpret the
incoming signals). However, these can be readily distinguished from their
higher-level equivalents in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, they are
much less flexible, and so much less prone to being manipulated. For exam-
ple, the contents of any visual memory simply reflect what has been processed
by the visual system—it cannot have contents that differ from this. Likewise,
any assumption used by perceptual processes (e.g., that lighting comes from
above) cannot be altered; it can only be overridden by higher-level control.
Practically speaking, then, the division proposed here is a reasonable one for
present purposes.
Frontiers in Psychology | Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1392 | 6
Kuhn et al. Taxonomy of misdirection
FIGURE 5 | Schematic diagram of the psychologically-based taxonomy, showing its highest levels. Here, divisions are based on the mechanisms
underlying the effects involved.
levels. In such a situation, however, their components could
be separated out, and the principles treated as “compounds”
composed of more basic units.
We next discuss these three categories in more detail:
PERCEPTUAL MISDIRECTION
This refers to misdirection that manipulates the perception
of an event. This category is somewhat similar to Lamont
and Wiseman’s physical misdirection, except that their cate-
gory includes only attentional processes7 , and so ignores non-
attentional factors such as occlusion. Most importantly, however,
unlike their physical misdirection, the categories here are centered
around a well-founded and well-articulated set of perceptual and
cognitive mechanisms.
A large number of misdirection techniques fall under this
category. The most basic division is that between attentional
and non-attentional mechanisms (Figure 4). This distinction has
important theoretical and practical implications. For example,
most attentional effects can be modulated by direct top-down
control, which is not necessarily the case for non-attentional
ones. Among other things, this highlights that the misdirection
of non-attentional perceptual mechanisms is more resilient to the
spectator’s own intentions.
Attentional misdirection
Given the central role of attentional processes in creating our con-
scious experience (e.g., Kuhn et al., 2008a; Rensink, 2010), it may
not be a surprise that their manipulation is the goal of the largest
group of perceptually-based misdirection techniques (Figure 6).
Attention is a notoriously difficult phenomenon to define; among
other things, it is currently unclear how many attentional process
there are, or exactly what each of them does (see e.g., Rensink,
2013). But whatever characterization is used, there appear to be
three distinct aspects of attention that can be manipulated, each
involving a distinct set of mechanisms:
1) Attentional focus, which describe what you are attending to.
2) Attentional timing, which describes when you pay attention.
7Lamont andWiseman also treat attention and eyemovements synonymously
even though (as mentioned earlier) the two can be dissociated.
3) Attentional resources, which describes how much attention is
given.
Note that subdivisions below this level are method-centered—
i.e., focused on “hijacking” the mechanisms that control the
processes underlying each of these three aspects (cf. Rensink and
Kuhn, under review). As for other parts of this taxonomy, we
expect that future research may well uncover other aspects of
attentional control, which would correspondingly give rise to new
subcategories in the taxonomy.
Control of attentional focus. This refers towhat is attended—e.g.,
a particular object, or a particular region of space. Many concepts
of misdirection refer to manipulating this aspect either explicitly
(Bruno, 1978; Lamont andWiseman, 1999), or implicitly through
creating zones of high and low interest (Sharpe, 1988). Techniques
where the magician orchestrates spatial attention are all grouped
in this category. Such misdirection can be divided into two main
subgroups: those triggered externally (i.e., reflexive, or exoge-
nous control) and those triggered internally (i.e., contextual, or
endogenous control).
External (reflexive) triggers. External triggers cause attention to be
controlled as a reflexive result of events in the environment—for
example, a bright flash. Such control can be further subdivided
into procedures involving physical, social, and emotive processes.
i) Physical. These techniques send attention toward objects or
events based on their inherent physical properties. For exam-
ple, we generally attend to objects that are visually salient,
such as a bright light (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005) or a blue card
amongst a set of red cards. The capture of attention by the
appearance of a new object (Yantis and Jonides, 1984) also
forms the basis of many misdirection techniques. Such tech-
niques need not be limited to the visual domain: an auditory
event such as a loud sound, or a somatosensory event such as
a light touch can also control attention.
ii) Social. Another form of attentional control involves social
interactions between the magician and his audience; these are
based on overlearned responses that are effectively automatic.
Both visual and conceptual forms exist. Visual social cues
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic diagram of attentional misdirection. Here, the initial level is based on the mechanisms affected (focus, timing, capacity). Later
divisions are based on the mechanisms that underlie the methods involved.
can send attention toward or away from selected locations or
objects via social directives (Kuhn et al., 2009). For example,
the magician may change his facial expression, or establish eye
contact to draw attention toward himself (Tamariz, 2007); if
attention needs to be directed away, he might use head, eye
gaze, pointing or body postures (Ganson, 1980; Kurtz, 1989).
Another powerful visual social cue that attracts attention is to
bring another person—especially a child—on stage (Bruno,
1978). All of these cues are visual since they result directly
from perceiving a visual signal.
Social directives can also act on a conceptual level, where
some degree of interpretation is involved. For example, ask-
ing someone a question, or requesting the persons’ name,
are powerful tools to draw attention to the magician (Kurtz,
1989; Tamariz, 2007). Actions that fluster a participant
(such as asking embarrassing questions) can—if used in
small doses—also draw attention toward the flustered person
(Bruno, 1978). A similar effect is achieved by using confusion
to draw attention away from the magician (Bruno, 1978).
iii) Emotive (or Affective). These are stimuli which are likely
to capture your attention via the emotions they induce
(Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001). This dimension is fre-
quently exploited by magicians. For example, the production
of a cute rabbit is highly likely to capture the audience’s
attention.
Internal (contextual) triggers. Although our attention can be cap-
tured by external events, we also have some degree of conscious
control over where we attend—such as when you decide to attend
to a particular location in a scene (Posner, 1980). Many mis-
direction techniques influence these processes by manipulating
internal goals or intentions, typically via narrative.
i) Explicit instruction. The most explicit form of this involves
the magician asking you to attend to something, e.g., a set
of cards being shuffled. Such misdirection is very effective,
but is likely to be noticed, and so raise suspicion. Rather than
explicitly instructing you to attend to a particular location,
then, a better approach is to ask you to do some task, one
that requires your attention—for instance, shuffling a deck of
cards or writing something down on a piece of paper. These
types of instructions commit your attention to the task and
prevent you from attending elsewhere.
ii) Surprise/suspense.Another effectivemanipulation is the use of
surprise. By definition, surprise is determined by your expec-
tations about the immediate future; magicians can manip-
ulate context to create many surprising events that are very
effective at capturing attention. For example, Blackstone had
a technician chase a duck that escaped from a box. Whilst the
audience focused their attention on the technician, another
person removed the remaining ducks from the box without
being noticed (Leech, 1960).
Related to this is the creation of suspense. This ensures that
you attend to the object or event in question, thereby pre-
venting any search for alternative explanations. For example,
imagine that a coin is held in one hand and the magician
explains that he will vanish a coin the third time it is struck
by the magic wand. The expectation that the coin will van-
ish creates considerable interest in the coin and so focuses
people’s attention on it. Then, instead of vanishing the coin,
the magician uses the misdirection to vanish the magic wand
(Supplementary Video 2).
iii) Implicit control. One of the more powerful principles in mis-
direction involves the use of implicit (i.e., unnoticed) sugges-
tions to essentially hijack the orienting of attention (see e.g.,
Rensink and Kuhn, under review). For example, magicians
often use patter to talk about certain objects or events, result-
ing in your attention being sent there without you being
aware of it. Implicit suggestions can increase or decrease the
level of attention given to something. For example, magicians
may reduce your level of attention by making an object
or event seem mundane. For example, in the coin vanish
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described above (Supplementary Video 2), magicians typi-
cally carry out the method on the third strike, when events
seem less novel (Kaufman, 1989). Another principle that falls
within this category is the idea that people are less likely to
attend to justified rather than unjustified actions (Lamont and
Wiseman, 1999). Similarly, sucker tricks and the theory of
false solutions can influence attentional processes in that we
simply pay less attention toward alternative solutions.
Much of implicit control relies on naturalness. Magicians
repeatedly state the importance of actions and props that
seem natural in order to avoid suspicion, and therefore, atten-
tion (Ganson, 1956; Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). Whether
something is natural or not depends on the event itself as
well as the context in which it occurs. For example, palm-
ing a card always results in a rather unnatural hand posture,
but the posture will seem much more natural if the hand
is holding a glass at the same time. Lamont and Wiseman
classify techniques relating to naturalness as part of psycho-
logical misdirection. However, as these principles work on
attentional mechanisms, we consider them part of perceptual
misdirection.
iv) Motivational control. Another powerful principle is to control
the motivation of the spectator to search for a method. For
example, a poorly motivated person is less likely to seek out
the method, and so more likely to attend to things the magi-
cian does not want them to see (Lamont andWiseman, 1999).
Other principles relate to the magician’s persona or exper-
tise: if the magician is more likeable, for example, you are
less likely to want to trip him up by attending to the wrong
location. One of the most skilled card magicians, Lennart
Green, often pretends to be incapable of handling playing
cards, reducing themotivation of the naïve spectator to search
for expert sleight of hand.
Control of attentional timing. Just as we can focus our atten-
tion on particular objects or locations in space, so can we focus
it on particular moments in time. Magicians have accordingly
developed several types of techniques that manipulate how much
attention is paid at a particular time within a magic trick. Such
control is similar to the temporal misdirection of Lamont and
Wiseman (Section Lamont and Wiseman: Magic in theory),
except that our taxonomy prioritizes the mechanisms, rather than
the methods by which the misdirection is achieved. People’s level
of attention can either be manipulated through physical cues, or
by exploiting fluctuations in attention that naturally occur dur-
ing the performance, and require a semantic understanding of the
performance.
i) Physical cues. Magicians have techniques to control the level
of attention, many of which rely on physical cues. Slydini,
a master in misdirection, developed body postures that led
to tensions and relaxations in attention (Ganson, 1980). For
example, forward postures will result in tension and thus
heighten people’s level of attention, whilst leaning back is an
apparent relaxation and reduces the level of attention.
ii) Semantic. Other techniques rely on an understanding of the
performance; thus, they are often categorized as semantic
techniques. People are less likely to pay attention to things
just after they have experienced the climax of a routine. For
example, in the Cups and Balls routine, people are less likely
to notice the magician’s hand going into his pocket just after
he has made a ball appear (Ganson, 1956). Humor can also
act as a powerful misdirection technique whereby people are
less likely to spot the method if it occurs immediately after
the joke. These off-beat moments can also be created by the
magician making an aside to the audience, as in the moment
the lighter is ditched before being vanished (Supplementary
Video 3).
One of the most powerful misdirection techniques involves
carrying out the procedure before the effect has started,
largely because most people do not expect the method to
take place outside the effect. For example, the magician could
vanish a lighter by apparently eating it, and the method is
simply that the lighter is already out of his hands before he
“eats” it (Supplementary Video 3) (this is similar to the pen
being out of the magician’s hands before the “vanish” motion
in Demacheva et al., 2012). Meanwhile, other magic tricks
require methods that are carried out after the effect. Again,
such procedures rely on the fact the people do not expect the
method to be conducted outside the effect, and so pay less
attention to them.
Control of attentional resources. The perception of informa-
tion depends not only on available information, but also on the
attentional resources available. People engaged in an attentionally-
demanding task often fail to notice extremely obvious events that
occur directly in front of them (Mack and Rock, 1998; Chabris
and Simons, 2009). Several types of misdirection are therefore
based on manipulating the attentional resources available. The
most explicit involves explicitly giving someone an attentionally-
demanding task. For example, the magician might ask a person to
count the number of face cards among those being dealt onto the
table. Since their attentional resources are occupied by this, they
will fail to notice things going on elsewhere (Smith et al., 2013).
A related form of this—which also plays a central role in Bruno’s
taxonomy (Section Joe Bruno: Anatomy of misdirection)—is the
creation of confusion. If lots of different things are going on at
the same time that require a lot of attention, the spectator will be
prevented from encoding much of the detail. (Of course this only
works as long as they can still follow the trick.)
One of the key rules in magic is that you should never repeat
the same effect with the same method. Indeed, empirical work
confirms that people are less effectively misdirected if the same
trick is repeated (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005). This is likely because
perceiving something for the first time requires more attentional
resources than when you experience it a second time, a phe-
nomenon known as perceptual fluency (Whittlesea and Leboe,
2000). For similar reasons magicians usually don’t tell the audi-
ence what they are about to do; the level of suspense requires more
attentional resources and thus prevents people from noticing the
method (Kuhn et al., 2008b).
Non-attentional misdirection
In addition to attention, our perception of a stimulus is influ-
enced by various other factors, such its visibility and the context
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FIGURE 7 | Schematic diagram of non-attentional misdirection. Here,
the mechanism affected is non-attentional perception (largely based on
perceptual organization, although further distinctions might be made 1 day).
Categories are based upon the various ways to control this.
in which it is presented. Non-attentional misdirection techniques
control the processes involved with these factors in one form or
other (Figure 7).
i) Masking. In masking, people are prevented from perceiving
an event by the presence of a physical occluder or competing
event—for example, the magician may secretly put his hand
into his jacket pocket whilst turning to one side, which then
interrupts the spectator’s line of sight (as used to vanish the
coin in Supplementary Video 2). Such masking is not limited
to the visual domain—magicians often mask an unwanted
sound by playing loudmusic or talking loudly. Likewise, pick-
pockets often use tactile masks (such as a strong pressure on
the wrist) to prevent the victim from noticing how they steal
the watch.
ii) Grouping. Another form of non-attentional misdirection
involves the control of groupingmechanisms.Magicians often
use camouflage to prevent people from seeing important parts
of their apparatus. For example in a levitation, the magician
must ensure that nobody sees the ropes that suspend the lady;
much of this relies on camouflage to prevent the segregation
of the object (i.e., the ropes) from the background. In essence,
these techniques control grouping (typically acting prior to
the operation of attention) so as to result in perceptual groups
that do not correspond to structures that exist in reality. A
related set of techniques uses optical illusions to achieve the
same result (Sharpe, 1985; Barnhart, 2010).
iii) Black light theater. Although traditionally not thought of
as misdirection, the ancient art of black light theater is
also part of non-attentional misdirection. Brightly-colored
objects appear and disappear in front of a black background
by being obscured with black cloth. Here the visual properties
of fluorescent colors cause a failure to distinguish the various
dark background items, making them appear to be part of a
single undifferentiated void.
MEMORY MISDIRECTION
Our memories of an event depend not only on how well it
has been perceived, but also on how well it has been retrieved.
Memory processes are inherently reconstructive—you can easily
misremember events that did not occur in real life (Fernyhough,
2012). Memory misdirection techniques can therefore affect the
memory of an event bymanipulating either the processes involved
in its maintenance or in its reconstruction. Two distinct sets of
techniques therefore exist: those based on forgetting, and those
based onmisremembering (Figure 8).
Forgetting
Many memory misdirection techniques try to ensure that rel-
evant information about a magic method is simply forgotten.
This can be done in several ways. For example, people remember
more of an event immediately after it has occurred, as com-
pared to some time later. The use of such delays is therefore an
important kind of memory misdirection, and one of the reasons
why magicians typically attempt to separate in time the method
from the effect (Fraps, 2014; Leech, 1960). Leech calls this prin-
ciple time misdirection; it is used in effects such as a prediction
that relies on forcing a card (Supplementary Video 4) so that
the spectator forgets which card he actually cut to. The extent
of forgetting also depends on what the spectator is doing dur-
ing the time delay; much is still unknown about what factors
influence this.
Another important principle is the idea of confusion. Although
akin to the similar concept used in other areas (attention),
here it relates to the how the complexity of the environment
affects memory: because our memory has a limited capacity,
the more items there are, the less likely we will remember them
all. There are several ways in which confusion can be created.
For example, in card magic, magicians typically create magic
routines that involve an entire deck of cards rather than a
single card.
Confusion also helps prevent the audience from determining
which details are relevant, further minimizing the chances that
important parts of the method are remembered. A popular way
of doing this is to provide the spectator with false solutions. These
often take the form of pretending to carry out one effect whilst
in fact doing something else (for example making a pen vanish
after making it clear that they were attempting to vanish a coin,
Supplementary Video 2). These techniques are often used to con-
trol attention, but they are also used to control memory: once we
have a solution in mind, we are more likely to forget alternatives
(Tamariz, 1988).
Related to this is distinctiveness. People are more likely to
remember events that are distinctive; as such, magicians try to
ensure that props or actions relating to the method lack dis-
tinctiveness, and thus will be quickly forgotten. This is typically
achieved by either manipulating the props themselves or by
manipulating the context and thus making them appear less
distinctive and less likely to be remembered. For example, a mind-
reading trick may require the spectator to write down a word;
if the writing is done quickly on a bland scrap of paper that is
used incidentally, the audience may forget that anything was ever
written down.
Misremembering
Our memories are far less stable than we intuitively believe,
with conscious recollection being based on a considerable degree
on reconstruction rather than retrieval (Fernyhough, 2012). As
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FIGURE 8 | Schematic diagram of memory misdirection. The initial level is based on the mechanisms affected (maintenance, reconstruction). The divisions
at lower levels are based on how these processes are controlled.
FIGURE 9 | Schematic diagram of memory misdirection. Here, the mechanism affected is undifferentiated “reasoning” (further distinctions might be made
1 day). Categories are based upon the various ways to control this.
such, the second category of memory misdirection involves the
control of this reconstructive process to cause events to be
misremembered. The most common form of this is people misre-
membering something as a related object or event, i.e., one similar
to the original in key ways (Schacter, 2001). For example, we
might see the magician perform an action that—at least to some
extent—resembles a card shuffle; we latermisremember it as a real
shuffle. Consequently, misremembering is another fundamental
principle in misdirection (Tamariz, 1988).
Another way to influence the contents of a reconstructed
memory is by suggestions. These can be given before, during or
after the event, and can be verbal or non-verbal. For example,
verbal suggestions given at the time of a spoon bending resulted
in people falsely remembering that the spoon was still bending
whilst on the table (Wiseman and Greening, 2005). Similarly,
visual suggestions that the magician threw a ball up in the air
resulted in people falsely remembering that the ball was thrown
(Kuhn and Land, 2006; Kuhn et al., 2010). Magicians likewise
use post-event suggestions. A common technique involves the
insertion of false claims when recapitulating the effect. For exam-
ple the magician may suggest that the spectator, rather than the
magician, shuffled the cards, in the hope that he/she will mis-
remember a crucial detail, namely who it was that shuffled the
cards (Giobbi, 1994); or suggest that the spectator cut to a partic-
ular card when in fact they cut to a different one (Supplementary
Video 4).
A final way to increase misremembering is to increase the time
lag between encoding and retrieval. As before, then, increasing
the delay between method and effect are powerful ways of mak-
ing it more likely that crucial aspects of the magic trick will be
misremembered.
REASONING MISDIRECTION
Even if someone perceives and remembers the method used in
a magic trick, this does not guarantee that it will be understood
as contributing to the effect. Thus, magicians also manipulate
the formation of your beliefs about what you just saw. In con-
trast to the last two categories (and perhaps reflecting our relative
lack of knowledge about higher-level cognition), the misdirection
of reasoning and beliefs is based on a set of techniques that are
currently more loosely defined, and with a less-comprehensive
structure (Figure 9).
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Ruse
At the back of every spectator’s mind lies the question as to why
the magician carried out a particular action. For example, after
seeing themagicianmake a coin disappear youmight wonder why
his hand went into his pocket: Was this the moment he got rid of
that coin? A ruse is an action that misdirects the spectator’s rea-
soning as to why an action was carried out. Magicians frequently
use ruses to cover the true purpose of an action (Fitzkee, 1945;
Lamont and Wiseman, 1999). The use of ruse is similar to the use
of justified actions in perceptual misdirection [Section Internal
(contextual) triggers], although applied to how people interpret
the event rather than whether it has been registered in the first
place.
Feigning actions
Experiencing magic requires people to not discover the true cause
of the effects. One way of doing this is to have them make false
attributions about the cause. As such, much of magic involves
feigning actions whereby the magician pretends to do one thing
when in fact he does something entirely different. In the French
Drop for example, the magician pretends to transfer the coin
from one hand to the other when in fact it remains in the orig-
inal hand (Supplementary Video 1). Such methods only work as
long as the spectator incorrectly interprets the event. Many dif-
ferent techniques can help magicians misdirect the way events are
interpreted.
The false transfer is another commonly-used way of making
small objects vanish. The magician pretends to hold a coin in
his hands for several seconds before revealing an empty hand;
this delay prevents people from suspecting a false transfer. Here
the magician exploits the concept of object permanence, whereby
we continue to perceive objects as present even when they are
not directly visible. These forms of concealment also allow the
magician to increase the delay between the method and the effect.
Several techniques can strengthen these effects; these are com-
monly known as convincers. For example, magicians may exploit
cross-modal attribution errors to misdirect people toward believ-
ing that the object is still present. For example, in a coin vanish,
the magician may use a false transfer which gives the impression
that the coin has been transferred to the other hand. To further
convince the audience that the coin is indeed in the other hand,
he could produce a sound that convinces people that the coin is
still in his hand by tapping the mimed coin on the table and gen-
erating the sound source through some other means (e.g., taping
a real coin under the table) (Ganson, 1980).
Wrong assumptions
Eachmember of an audience has a set of pre-existing assumptions
about the nature of the magic show, assumptions that they bring
along to the performance. Whilst some of these assumptions are
correct, others are not. Much of misdirection involves manipulat-
ing and exploiting these assumptions. These include the following
principles:
Dual reality. Many magic tricks involve interactions between the
magician and a selected member of the audience. There is an
implicit assumption that the selected member experiences the
same sequence of events as does the rest of the audience. But this
assumption is often false. Consequently, magicians often exploit
the misalignment between different people’s understanding of an
event, known as the principle of Dual Reality. For example, the
magician might use trickery to ensure the volunteer experiences a
different event compared to the rest of the audience, while using
linguistic subtleties to convince both parties that they experi-
enced the same events. The concept of dual reality is an extremely
powerful principle in magic.
Multiple outs.Most people assume that a magic trick has a single
pre-determined end. However, many tricks have multiple possible
endings, allowing the magician to choose between them, depend-
ing on what other choices have been made. For example, multiple
predictions for each of the numbers 1–4 could be in an envelope;
the magician would remove only the appropriate one based on
the spectators choice. The principle of multiple outs is a powerful
method that uses linguistic cues to misdirect people’s interpreta-
tion of the event. Moreover, it also relies on peoples’ erroneous
assumptions about the nature of magic tricks (i.e., all tricks have
a pre-determined end).
Effort put into an effect. It is difficult for non-magicians to real-
ize how much time, effort and money can be put into what might
appear to be a simple trick (Teller, 2012). Thus, people will often
exclude potential solutions to a trick simply because they believe
that no-one would go to so much effort just to create it. This false
assumption is powerfully exploited when magicians pretend to
perform a trick as an impromptu demonstration (whereas in real-
ity vast amounts of preparation have gone into preparing it). This
might explain why people tend to experience impromptu magic
demonstrations as being more impressive than large-scale stage
illusions.
Pre-show. Another false assumption commonly made is that
magic tricks begin when the performer says they begin. However,
many magicians use pre-show work to gather information about
members of the audience, which can then be used later on in the
show. The misdirection here involves using subtle forms of lan-
guage and deception that prevent the other audience members
from realizing that this information could have been gathered
beforehand.
CONCLUSION
Performing magic does not necessarily require a deep under-
standing of why misdirection works; most magic practitioners
are simply interested in improving their magic performance.
Consequently, previous taxonomies of misdirection have tended
to emphasize those aspects dealing directly with technique.
However, in recent years there has been increased interest in
understanding why these techniques (and their related princi-
ples) work, ideally by linking them to what is known of human
cognition (Kuhn et al., 2008a). To facilitate this, we have pro-
posed here a way to organize knowledge about magic (or at least,
misdirection) such that is based on our current understanding of
perception and cognition. Our psychologically-based taxonomy
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is far from complete, and as our understanding of both mis-
direction and cognition advance, aspects of this taxonomy will
change. But we envisage that it will help the dialog between magi-
cians and scientists and act as a useful perspective from which
to explain the psychological mechanisms involved. Among other
things, we hope that it will help highlight misdirection principles
to an audience with less knowledge in magic. We also hope that it
might provide a template for a similar organization of knowledge
about other aspects of magic more generally (see also Rensink and
Kuhn, under review).
Defining misdirection has been far from trivial, and there is
still no general consensus on its definition. We chose a rather
broad definition of misdirection so as to include a wide range of
cognitive mechanisms. If our definition is too broad, we could be
in danger of developing a taxonomy of magic in general rather
than misdirection. Whilst Hugard (1960), implicitly suggests that
misdirection and magic can indeed be used synonymously, we do
not intend to develop a complete taxonomy of magic here. Indeed
there are countless magic principles that do not fall within our
taxonomy, in that they do not involve misdirection (e.g. forcing,
optical illusions, suggestions. . . ).
Magicians are undoubtedly masters of deception. But they
tend to be skeptical about whether science can teach them any-
thing about misdirection, or magic in general (Teller, 2012).
In most other domains (e.g., medicine or sports), practition-
ers have improved performance by understanding the mech-
anisms involved. It’s hard to see why magic should be an
exception. Thus, although our psychologically-based taxonomy
is primarily intended to further our understanding of cogni-
tion, it may well help magicians improve their misdirection. To
begin with, it could help magicians draw links between mis-
direction and formal theories of cognition, which could help
them develop more effective tricks. For example, there is much
scientific knowledge about several rather counter-intuitive cog-
nitive biases and illusions (e.g., change blindness, inattentional
blindness, false memories, choice blindness), which helps explain
the mechanisms behind these illusions. And as in any other
domain, it is likely that knowledge about the cognitive pro-
cesses will eventually lead to improvements in the methods used,
and maybe even new misdirection principles (see also Williams
and McOwan, 2014; Rensink and Kuhn, under review). In any
event, we hope that our taxonomy will encourage further scien-
tific research in the field, and so help us better understand the
human mind.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at: http://www.frontiersin.org/journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.
01392/abstract
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